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ABSTRACT 
Smart home system (SHS) is a kind of information system aiming at realizing 
home automation. The SHS can connect with almost any kind of 
electronic/electric device used in a home so that they can be controlled and 
monitored centrally.  
Today’s technology also allows the home owners to control and monitor the 
SHS installed in their homes remotely. This is typically realized by giving the 
SHS network access ability. 
Although the SHS’s network access ability brings a lot of conveniences to the 
home owners, it also makes the SHS facing more security threats than ever before. 
As a result, when designing a SHS, the security threats it might face should be 
given careful considerations. 
System security threats can be solved properly by understanding them and 
knowing the parts in the system that should be protected against them first. This 
leads to the idea of solving the security threats a SHS might face from the 
requirements engineering level. 
Following this idea, this paper proposes a systematic approach to generate the 
security requirements specifications for the SHS. It can be viewed as the first step 
toward the complete SHS security requirements engineering process. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the major causes of the information system design failure is that its 
functionalities and performance do not meet its stakeholders’ expectations. 
Problems in the requirements engineering process, such as the ambiguous and 
inconsistent requirements specifications, the inadequate verification of the 
specified system requirements and the improper responses to the requirements 
changing requests, are among the main reasons for causing such a failure 
(Sommerville, Software engineering, 9th edition, 2011) . 
At the same time, most of the information systems today face more security 
threats than ever before as a result of their enhanced network access ability. 
Although this ability brings convenience to personal life, it also increases the 
possibility for the information systems to be attacked maliciously. If an 
information system is designed without the consideration of the security threats it 
might face then it is less useful or worthless. 
Smart home system (SHS) is a kind of information system aiming at realizing 
home automation (Home automation). Its build in network access ability allows 
its users to know the status of their homes remotely and also allows them to 
control the facilities in their homes remotely.  
The users of the SHS can also use it to do a lot of other useful things like the 
home entertainments, on-line chatting and the elderly monitoring.  
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Clearly, if there is no security mechanisms build into the SHS then it can be 
intruded by the hackers easily and the results are the hackers can control every 
home facilities connected with it, modify the critical data stored in it and report 
fake information about the home status to the home owners. 
The discussion above indicates that the requirements engineering and the 
security mechanisms are among the key factors for a SHS to gain the commercial 
success in the market. As a result, this paper proposes an approach on generating 
the security requirements specifications of a SHS. The aim of this approach is to 
understand and solve the security threats a SHS might face from the requirements 
engineering level and to produce its security requirements specifications in a 
systematic way. 
Following the introduction this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
reviews current the security engineering practices in the field and in the SHS; this 
section also identifies the problem to be solved by this paper. Section 3 proposes a 
systematic approach to generate the security requirements specifications for a 
SHS. Section 4 is the case study and section 5 summarizes the work done in this 
paper and points out the future directions. 
 
  
 
 
3 
 
Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Requirements engineering and security, as discussed in chapter 1, are key 
factors for a SHS system to gain commercial success in market and they are the 
backgrounds for further discussion. As a result this chapter gives some discussion 
on these factors. 
2.1 View requirements as conditions to meet to solve problems 
A system is useless if it does not do what the stakeholders need it to do; this is 
also true for the information systems.  
The needs from stakeholders define the system at the most abstract level; 
because these needs just state what is needed and say nothing on how to design 
and implement such a system. As an example, a need from stakeholders could be 
“We need a new server system that can handle 100 transactions concurrently.” 
The needs from stakeholders also present the highest level problems that 
should be solved during system designing process. If these problems are properly 
identified and solved then the needs from stakeholders would be met. Stated in 
another way, meeting stakeholders’ needs is the process of solving the problems 
presented in their needs. 
Problems can be viewed as obstacles on the way of reaching desired results. 
Solving problems is the process of knowing the problems and finding conditions 
that can lead to the problems solutions. 
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Generally, solving problems is a multi-stage activity. For a given problem and 
in the first stage of problem solving, efforts are exerted to find conditions (ideally 
necessary and sufficient) that can lead to the problem solutions. But meeting these 
conditions may not be an easy task; as a result, these conditions become problems 
themselves and this leads us to the second stage of problem solving process. In 
the second stage, efforts are exerted again to find conditions leading to the 
problem solutions. This process is repeated until, at a certain stage, the conditions 
that lead to problem solutions can be met easily. These conditions are at the 
bottom of the problem solving process. The meeting of conditions at bottom 
solves the problems at the bottom stage; and, in general, the solved problems at a 
certain stage will solve the problems at the stage that is above it. Such a process is 
the general problem solving process.   
Solving the problems presented in stakeholders’ needs is similar to the general 
problem solving process. The problems should be identified as clear as possible 
and then conditions that can lead to the solutions should be identified. These 
conditions are in fact requirements for system; they are what we the system 
designers are required to do to solve the problem. 
Also similar to the general problem solving process, these conditions may 
become the new problems the system developers should solve in system 
developing process. 
Holding this view of point, requirements can be defined as a description of 
conditions that should be met by system designing and implementation at 
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successive system development stages. These conditions can be system’s 
operational, functional characteristics or constraints. 
2.2 The role of requirements in system design and implementation 
Requirements play important role in system design and implementation. 
Without stable requirements the project is to be flounder (Elizabeth Hull, 2011).   
With requirements, the system developers can evaluate if a design can fulfill 
the requirements or not and at what cost; can predicate what could be if the design 
fail to meet the requirements. When a changing request for a requirement raises, 
either from customer or development team side, its impact on the whole system 
can be evaluated; as a result one can determine whether to accept such a change 
or not. 
In summary, the requirements are used for: project planning, risk 
management, acceptance testing, trade off and change control (Sommerville, 
Software engineering, 9th edition, 2011) (Elizabeth Hull, 2011). 
2.3 Requirements engineering 
Because system requirements are so important, a systematic way is needed to 
create, verify/validate and manage them. This is the place where the requirements 
engineering come in. 
Requirements engineering (REE) as defined by Elizabeth Hull et al is “the 
subset of systems engineering concerned with discovering, developing, tracing, 
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analyzing, qualifying, communicating and managing requirements that define the 
system at successive levels of abstraction.” (Elizabeth Hull, 2011). 
Sommerville has defined RE as “The process of finding out, analyzing, 
documenting, and checking the services and constraints is called Requirements 
Engineering (RE)”  (Sommerville, Software engineering, 2007). 
As a result, the main steps in REE process are requirements elicitation, 
analysis/derivation, specification, verification/validation and management. 
2.3.1 Requirements elicitation 
Requirements elicitation is the process to identify system requirements from 
stakeholders’ needs. They are the system requirements that define the system at 
the highest abstraction level. 
2.3.2 Requirements analysis/derivation 
Requirements analysis/derivation means to analyze system requirements 
which define system at certain abstraction level and derive new system 
requirements from them.  
2.3.3 Requirements specification 
Initially, requirements elicited from stakeholders’ needs or derived from 
system requirements that define system at a certain abreaction level would be an 
(vague) idea in the requirements engineers’ mind. They should be expressed out 
in some way so that they can be analyzed and inspected concretely. The process 
to express requirements concretely is called requirements specification. 
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Depending on the actual need, the requirements can be specified informally by 
using natural language or formally by using formal language. 
Requirements specifications should be clear (does not contain ambiguity), 
consistent (does not contradict with each other), complete (enough for developing 
solutions) and testable (be used as a testing acceptance criteria) (Elizabeth Hull, 
2011). But most importantly, they should reflect the “real” meaning of system 
requirements. 
2.3.4 Requirements verification/validation 
Requirements verification/validation is the process of checking that the 
specified requirements actually define the system that the customer really wants 
(Sommerville, Software engineering, 9th edition, 2011). If they are not, the 
requirements would be re-analyzed and re-specified. 
As a result the requirements analysis, specification and verification stages are 
not totally separated, they are related with each other. 
2.3.5 Requirements management 
Requirements management is to manage the requirements after they are 
specified and verified. Activities in requirements management include 
requirements changing and tracing management. 
2.3.6 Requirements engineering process at successive system 
developing stages 
A system development process is carried out at successive system abstraction 
levels, starting from the most abstract one and ending at the most concrete one. 
These successive system abstraction levels are corresponding to successive 
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system developing stages. Each of the stages would impose some requirements to 
its successive stage. As a result, ideally, for each of the system developing stages, 
the requirements engineering cycle would be repeated. This can be summarized in 
the following Figure 1 (Elizabeth Hull, 2011) 
 
Figure 1: Requirement engineering process 
 
The problem domain is the domain in which a system is going to be used to 
solve the problems (needs) presented by stakeholders (Elizabeth Hull, 2011). The 
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requirements engineering process in problem domain aims at forming stakeholder 
requirements that define the system at highest abstraction level.  
The solution domain is where engineers use their ingenuity to solve problems 
(Elizabeth Hull, 2011). Requirement engineering process in the solution domain is 
to derive system requirements at successive system abstraction levels.  
If the system developers, when developing the system, jump directly into the 
solution domain, the chances are the functionalities the system provides are not 
those expected from system stakeholders.   
2.4 Security and sound security engineering practice 
Hardware, programs and data are system assets in an information system and 
malicious persons can bring harms to them. For example, system CPU and hard 
disk can be physically destroyed; confidential data can be read, copied, deleted or 
altered maliciously. The consequence of allowing the harms to happen is typically 
a disaster (Philip Koopman, Carnegie Mellon University, 2004), (Charles B. 
Haley, 2008). 
Security in the information systems is the mechanism to prevent such harms 
from happening. Harms can be viewed as security threats and system assets that 
are under the threatening of security threats are security assets. 
Because of the booming of mobile applications, the wide availability of 
network access and the increasing system interconnection, security problems in 
the information systems today are more severe than ever before. If there is no 
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security mechanism being designed into the information systems, malicious 
persons can bring security threats to them easily.  
Security is easier to archive if there is a clear model of what is to be protected 
and who is allowed to do what (Tanenbaum, 2007). Some security engineering 
practitioners also suggest that system developers should firstly establish a sound 
security policy and treat security as an integral part of system design to solve 
security problems. (Rushby, 2001), (Charles B. Haley, 2008), (Guttorm Sindre, 
2004) 
This makes sense that a sound security engineering practice should start from 
requirements engineering level. Beginning with stakeholders’ security needs, 
system developers proceed to generate stakeholders’ security requirements; then 
the system security requirements are derived from them and finally security 
solutions are developed according to the system security requirements. 
 A finished system could be either over protected or under protected if 
security problems are solved directly from solution domain. Over protecting 
means additional cost, under protecting means there are security leaks in system. 
Both of them are not expected. 
2.5 Smart home system (SHS) and its security problem 
Smart home system (SHS) is a kind of information system aiming at realizing 
home automation. Anything in a home that uses electricity can be put on the SHS 
and at your command (Goodwin, 2010).  
 
 
11 
 
A SHS can be viewed as a collection of nodes and each node has its dedicated 
functionalities. Some of the nodes in the SHS are sophisticated embedded 
systems. They have powerful CPU and operating system; they run application 
code in RAM instead of ROM and they store files in flash storage system. Stated 
in another way, they are more likely a traditional PC system; for example, there 
are SHS running Linux seen in market (Goodwin, 2010). 
The PC like feature and the build-in network access ability in SHS make them 
also facing the security threats seen in desktop and server system. Clearly, when a 
SHS is developed security problems must be considered. 
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Chapter 3 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A key feature for information system is security; but how are security 
problems understood and solved in practice and particularly in SHS?  
3.1 Security engineering practice as an add on feature 
  “Information systems security issues have usually been considered only after 
the system has been developed completely, and rarely during its design, coding, 
testing or deployment process” (Ambrosio Toval). 
 “The security is often treated by embedded system designers as the addition 
of features to the system” (Paul Kocher, 2004). 
These statements indicate that the security is not considered as an integrated 
part of the system design process. Instead, it is often considered when the 
designing of other system features is finished. 
One of the consequences of solving the security threats a system might face in 
this manner is the system’s structure could be destroyed by the added security 
mechanisms; another consequence is that the system performance can be severely 
affected by the added security mechanisms. 
As a result, many security engineering practitioners argue to understand and 
solve the security threats a system might face from the requirements engineering 
level. 
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3.2 Security engineering practice as a part of requirements engineering 
process 
What is the situation if the security threats are understood and solved from the 
requirements engineering level? 
John Wilander et al present a survey on the security requirements engineering 
in their paper (John Wilander and Jens Gustavsson, 2005). The paper surveyed the 
security requirements specifications in 11 different kinds of information systems. 
They are the billing, accounting, e-business and other information systems. 
The outcome of this survey is not optimistic. One conclusion presented in the 
paper is: “the security requirement is poorly specified.” The main problems in the 
specification are the inconsistent selection of the security requirements and the 
inconsistent level of details of the specified security requirements.  
Inconsistent selection of the security requirements means some relevant 
security areas are fairly well specified whereas other are completely left out (John 
Wilander and Jens Gustavsson, 2005). 
As examples, John Wilander et al point out in their paper that all systems 
surveyed have requirements which indicate that restricted access is important. At 
the same time only three specifications require some kind of encryption of data 
communication and only two specifications require physical security including 
restricted physical access. 
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Inconsistent level of detail means some security requirements have a high 
level of detail whereas others in the same specification are only specified on a 
general level (John Wilander and Jens Gustavsson, 2005). 
John Wilander et al also give an example on this factor: “This phenomenon 
can be seen in for instance the E-Business system where the requirements on 
logging are very detailed (eight requirements on what info to be logged) and at 
the same time digital signatures are specified as: The system should be able to 
handle the use of electronic signatures with no further details.” 
This conclusion indicates that there are still problems in the security 
engineering process even if the security issues are understood and solved from the 
requirements engineering level. 
Another important conclusion presented in this survey is that most of the 
security requirements are functional instead of being non-functional. Because the 
survey result reveals more than 75% of the security requirements (164 out of 216) 
boils down to functional requirements. This is a good indication that most of the 
security requirements can be formalized. 
3.3 Security engineering practice in SHS 
Papers, like (Rosslin John Robles, 2010), (Eržen, 2012) (Mohd Ariff Razaly, 
2012 ), (Georgios Mantas, 2011) and others, are trying to discuss the 
countermeasures to address a particular or some kinds of security threats a SHS 
might face.  
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Although these papers provide great information, by just putting the 
countermeasures proposed in those papers blindly into the SHS under 
development may result in system overprotection or under protection. This may 
also bring the unnecessary development cost.  
In another words, in order to build proper and efficient security mechanisms 
for a particular SHS under development, there is a need to know exactly what are 
the security threats it might face first; then the system developers can define 
security requirements for it and finally proper countermeasures proposed in these 
papers can be selected or new countermeasures can be established to deal with 
those security threats.  
This means the security problems in the SHS should be understood and solved 
from the requirements engineering level. But none of these and others papers, 
discussing the security threats in the SHS, surveyed so far addresses this issue. 
Taking this discovery and the poorly specified system security requirements 
as problems, this paper proposes an approach to systematically generate the 
security requirements specification for a SHS under development. The generated 
specifications would be consistency in both of the selection of security 
requirements and the level of details. This approach can be viewed as the first step 
toward the complete SHS security requirements engineering process. 
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Chapter 4 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
4.1 Introduction: 
The solution is to understand and solve the security problems in the SHS from 
requirements level. The focus of this solution is on requirements specifications; 
because (sound) requirements specifications are the basis for further system 
development.  
4.2 Solution process:  
 Three main steps are needed to generate the SHS security requirements 
specifications and they are depicted in Figure 2. 
Step 1 analyzes the security needs proposed by stakeholders. These needs 
define the system’s security features at the highest level and they are abstract. 
Nothing is mentioned on what parts in the SHS should be protected and how to 
protect them. So one of the main purposes of this step is to identify the security 
threats a SHS might face and the parts in it that should be protected. 
The output of this step is a SHS security threats profile and it contains five 
parts. They are, in turn, the abstract system model; the system node information 
table; the security threats check list; the security assets/threats table and the abuse 
cases. The security threats profile is the basis for defining system security 
requirements. 
Step 2 defines the high level security requirements for each of the parts in the 
SHS that should be protected by some kinds of security mechanisms. They are 
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described abstractly by just stating that a system part should be protected from a 
particular security threat. The threats profile generated in step 1 is used to assist 
this step. 
Step 3 derives the functional system security requirements from the high level 
abstract security requirements defined in step 2. These derived functional security 
requirements are specified informally in natural language. This step is also 
assisted by the threats profile. 
Step 1 can enhance the consistency in the selection of the security 
requirements because it forces the system developers to identify the security 
threats a SHS might face as completed as possible and as a result there is less 
chances to leave out security requirements on some security relevant areas. 
Step 2 and 3 can enhance the consistency in the level of specification details 
because they require the system developers to define the high level security 
requirements first and then to derive the functional security requirements. 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 2: Three steps to generate the SHS security requirements 
4.3 Detailed discussion 
As discussed in chapter 2, system assets in an information system are system 
hardware, software and data/information stored in such a system. The security 
assets are those system assets that face security threats.  
4.3.1 Creating the SHS security threats profile 
The first step towards the sound security requirements engineering process in 
any information system is to know what security threats it might face and the 
parts that should be protected from them. Implementing security mechanisms 
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without knowing the security threats may result in waste of money and effort 
(Suvda Myagmar), (Dale R. Thompson) (Microsoft, J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman), 
(Tanenbaum, 2007). 
A systematic approach is needed to create the SHS security threats profile; 
creating it without carefully planned steps would also result in improper security 
threats solutions. Figure 3 depicts the steps used to create the SHS security threats 
profile. 
Figure 3: Steps to create the SHS security threats profile 
4.3.1.1 Define abstract system model for the SHS under development: 
The SHS is not a new conception and there are a lot of commercial SHS on 
the market. Based on the researches made on these SHS, a general SHS abstract 
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model is defined and is depicted in Figure 4. (This is not to say the proposed 
solution excludes other general abstract model)
 
Figure 4: A general abstract SHS model 
In essence, a SHS is a kind of communicating network composed by different 
system modules and communication links. Each module has its dedicated 
functionalities. For example the main control module is responsible for receiving 
user commands, coordinating the operation of the system and reporting the system 
status to the home owners. And all the modules in the SHS are working together 
to provide the overall SHS functionalities.  
The ovals in the abstract system model represent the different system nodes in 
a SHS. A single node is an abstraction of a particular module in the SHS. For 
example, the main node abstracts the main control module and a security sub node 
abstracts the security module in the SHS. 
The double heads arrow is the abstraction of the communication links between 
the system modules. In reality these links could be in either wired or wireless 
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form. The double heads arrow also indicates that the link is usually a two way 
communication link.  
It is possible for a node to be as complicated as a communicating network 
itself. But these details are ignored and the focus is on the overall functionalities it 
provides. 
It is common for the SHS to be accessed through a PC, a smart phone or a 
tablet. The specially designed SHS control software is running on these devices. 
The users can use this software to control and monitor the SHS remotely. Based 
on this observation, for a SHS, these kinds of devices are abstracted as a remote 
node. 
If a SHS under development has the structure described in this general 
abstract model then its abstract system model can be an instance of it.  
The main purpose of this step is to reduce the number of system assets to be 
evaluated against security threats. When doing the evaluation, instead of 
evaluating every system assets, only the abstract system nodes and the 
communication links are considered. 
4.3.1.2 Identify security assets and security threats in the SHS 
This stage identifies the security assets in a SHS and the security threats they 
may face. Figure 5 describes the steps to identify security assets and security 
threats in a SHS. 
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Figure 5: Steps to identify security assets and security threats in SHS 
In the first step, related information is collected for the nodes identified in the 
abstract SHS model. The information to be collected is the functionalities, 
interfaces, communication links and data of a node. Additional information may 
also be collected depending on the actual needs.  
The collected information could be recorded in the nodes information table. 
The table is depicted in Figure 6. Typically, such information could be obtained 
by reading other system development documents and the collected information is 
used to assist the determination of the security threats a node might face. 
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Figure 6: Nodes information Table 
The second step, if the security threats checklist is not available yet, is the 
creation of the security threats checklist for the SHS.  
The checklist is used to list possible security threats the SHS might face and 
once it is created the system developer can use it to evaluate whether the system is 
under the risk of a particular security threat. The checklist can also be updated as 
needed and reused when developing similar systems in future.  
A SHS might face many security threats and sometimes they seem to be 
complicated but some of them may fall into a particular category. As a result 
security threats categorization could be an effective way to manage the 
complexity. 
The main parts in the SHS are network interface, nodes and internal 
communication links and they are the targets of the security threats. As a result, 
the security threats a SHS might face can be categorized by considering whether 
they are targeting at the network interface, the nodes or the internal 
communication links.  Based on this observation the security threats checklist for 
the SHS is defined and it is shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Security threats checklist table 
The system developers can focus on the network interface first when building 
the security threats checklist. The possible security threats on the network 
interface are recorded into the table with their names and descriptions. The same 
process is applied to the internal communication links and nodes. 
When the nodes information table and the security threats checklist are ready, 
the third step is to evaluate the system nodes in the SHS under development 
against the security threats checklist. The user interfaces, functionalities, 
communication link and data on a particular node is evaluated in turn to see 
whether they are under the risk of the security threats listed in the checklist. If the 
answer is yes then a node is determined as a security asset. The evaluating results 
are recorded in the SHS security assets and threats table. This table is depicted in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: SHS security assets and security threats table 
If the node is under the risk of a specific threat then the corresponding unit in 
the table is marked as “Y”. 
The priority of a particular security threat imposed on a node is also recorded 
in this table. But this information is obtained and filled in the prioritization step. 
4.3.1.3 Defining abuse case for security threats and determining their 
possibility and risk level 
An abuse case for each of the security threats a node might face is defined in 
this stage. Abuse case is the descriptions of the interactions between a hacker and 
a system that carry out the security threats on system which resulting in harm 
(John McDermott).  
The purpose of defining abuse case is to force the system developers to think 
as a hacker so that a better understanding on how a particular security threat can 
be carried out is obtained. Such an understanding is helpful in determining the 
possibility and the risk level of a particular security threat.  
This understanding is also helpful in knowing what methods can be used to 
prevent these steps from being carried out. 
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The abuse case would be recorded in the template depicted in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Abuse case template 
In the template, the abuse case number is the reference number for a 
particular abuse case; the abuse case name gives a description of what it is about; 
the source section records the originating of this abuse case; the purpose section 
illustrates the goal of carrying out this particular security threat; the steps section 
summarizes the main steps used to accomplish the goal; the consequence section 
records the possible results if such a security threat is carried out successful. 
The possibility section records the chance for this security threat to happen; 
the risk level sections records the severity of the consequence and these two 
factors are used to determine the priority of a threat. 
Possibility is quantified against three criteria: the level of skills needed, time 
and money cost needed to perform the attacks. For a particular security threat, 
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these criteria are scored within the range of 1 – 3. The scores are recorded in the 
corresponding locations in the abuse case template; they are summed and 
averaged. The possibility is the reciprocal of the averaged result, so the possibility 
value ranges from 0.3-1. Under this algorithm, the higher the average is the less 
possibility for it to occur. Inspired by, (Microsoft, J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman) 
(Suvda Myagmar), (EbenezerA.Oladimeji), Figure 10 is the table that records the 
possibility scoring criteria. 
Figure 10: Possibility scoring criteria 
Risk level quantification is also done by scoring a set of evaluating criteria in 
the range of 1 – 3 then summing these scores and averaging the sum. Damage 
potential, reproducibility, and number of users affected are the criteria for 
evaluating the risk level. The scores are also recorded in the abuse case template. 
It is intuitive that the higher these scores are the higher risk level a security 
threat can impose on the system. Figure 11 is the table records risk level scoring 
criteria (Microsoft, J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman). 
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Figure 11: Risk level scoring criteria 
4.3.1.4 Prioritizing threats  
Due to the cost, time to market and other constraints, it is impossible to 
mitigate all the possible security threats a system might face (Suvda Myagmar).  
At the same time not all the security threats would have the same importance 
level. Some of them would bring severe consequence to the system and is very 
likely to happen; some of them are severe but are unlikely to happen; while others 
are less likely to happen and would bring inconsequence harm to the system. So 
there is a need to evaluate the priority of the security threats. By knowing the 
priority, the system developers may exert their efforts to solve high priority 
security threats and they may decide to accept the happening of a low priority 
security threat. 
Priority should be quantified. The priority number would help the system 
developers to understand the severity of a particular security threat. 
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A simple algorithm is used in this approach: Priority = Possibility * Risk level 
(Suvda Myagmar), (Microsoft, J.D. Meier, Alex Mackman).  Possibility and risk 
level are already determined when defining abuse cases so that the calculation of 
priority is straightforward. The calculated priority values are recorded into the 
SHS security assets and threats table. 
If the priority of a security threat imposed on a node is lower enough then the 
system developers may chose to accept such a threat to happen. 
After these 4 steps, the SHS security threats profile is generated. It has five 
parts: an abstract system model, nodes information table, a security threat check 
list, a system security assets and threats table and a collection of abuse cases. This 
profile would give the system developers a good understanding of the threats the 
SHS under development might face; how these threats can be carried out and their 
priorities.  This profile is also the basis for defining system security requirements. 
4.3.2 Defining high level security requirements 
The system developers would use the SHS security assets and security threats 
table to assist this defining work.  
For each of the nodes in the table, if it is under the risk of a particular security 
threat and if the threat has a high priority value then a high level security 
requirement is defined on it; if the threat has a low priority value then the system 
developers may chose to allow the threat to happen and there is no high level 
security requirement defined against that threat.  
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For example, if the main control node in a SHS is under the threat of spoofing 
security threat and the priority value is 3 then a high level security requirement 
can be defined as: “The main control node should be protected from spoofing 
threat whenever there is an attempt to access it from network.” 
The defined high level security requirements are recorded in the security 
requirement table which is shown in Figure 12.  
The category section indicates this requirement is security requirement; the 
number section contains the numerical identification of this security requirement; 
the name section describes the name of the security requirement; the source 
section is used to identify the originality of this security requirement.  
The derived functional security requirements are also recorded in this table; 
but these contents are filled when the process goes to that phase. 
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Figure 12: SHS security requirements table 
4.3.3 Deriving functional security requirements from high level 
security requirements 
This phase aims at deriving the functional security requirements from the high 
level security requirements. Ideally, the implementations of those functional 
requirements in the system would fulfill the high level security requirements. 
Three steps are needed to derive the functional security requirements and they are 
depicted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Steps to derive functional security requirements for the SHS 
under development 
4.3.3.1 Analyze high level security requirements 
This step is to find some clues for finding/defining suitable countermeasures 
to fulfill high level security requirements. The abuse cases can be used to assist 
this step because they describe how the security threats can be carried out. 
4.3.3.2 Identify/define suitable countermeasures 
In this step proper countermeasures are identified or defined to fulfill high 
level security requirements.  
Many of the security threats imposed on the information systems had been 
analyzed in great detail and a lot of countermeasures are proposed to deal with 
them. As a result, for a particular high level security requirement, the task is to 
find the suitable countermeasures and tailor it for the system under development. 
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Sometimes, due to some domain/application specific constraints, there are no 
available countermeasures and as a result, new countermeasures should be 
defined to resolve the security threats. 
4.3.3.3 Describe countermeasures in form of functional requirements  
In this step, the identified/defined countermeasures are specified in the form 
of functional security requirements and they are recorded into the derived 
functional security requirements section of the security requirements table. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter introduces a systematic method to generate security requirements 
for the SHS. The main outputs of this method are the system security threats 
profile and a collection of system security requirements specifications.   
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Chapter 5 
CASE STUDY 
The approach proposed in chapter 4 is applied to an imaginary SHS. The 
purpose of this chapter is to give an example on how to use the proposed 
approach to generate the SHS security requirements specifications.  
5.1 The imaginary SHS: 
5.1.1 System functionalities and system structure 
Many practical SHS are researched for their functionalities, structures and 
user interfaces when the imaginary SHS is being defined. As a result, the 
functionalities of the imaginary SHS are common among the SHS seen in the 
market. The functionalities of the imaginary SHS are lighting control, HVAC and 
home safety/security. The system structure confirms to one described in the 
general abstract SHS system model (Figure 4). 
Each of the functionalities is implemented by an individual module and these 
modules communicate with each other through the wireless communication links.  
There is a specially designed SHS controlling software runs on the mobile 
tablet in this imaginary SHS. A user can use that software to control and 
communicate with the SHS remotely. User commands are sent to the host 
controller and then the host controller passes these commands to related modules. 
System status can be obtained and displayed on the mobile tablet upon user 
request or in other user definable manner. This mobile tablet corresponds to the 
remote node as discussed in chapter 4.  
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It is possible for this SHS to be controlled by other kind of remote node but 
for simplicity it is assumed the mobile tablet is the only remote node in this SHS. 
5.2 The applying of the proposed solution 
The stakeholders’ security needs for the imaginary SHS can be expressed as 
simple as a single sentence: “The newly developed SHS should be secure”; and 
this is the start point for the security requirements development process.  
The purpose of this case study is for illustration; as a result only the security 
requirements for the host controller will be generated by using the proposed 
method. 
5.2.1 Creating the SHS security threats profile 
5.2.1.1 Abstract system model for the imaginary SHS 
The abstract system model of the imaginary SHS which is shown in figure 14 
is an instance of the general abstract SHS system model that is discussed in 
chapter 4. This is because its structure confirms to the structure of it. 
.  
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Figure 14: Abstract system model for the imaginary SHS 
5.2.1.2  Identify security assets and  security threats 
The first step in this process is to build the nodes information table. The 
building of it is straight forward because the information needed can be obtained 
by reading other system design/development documents. In this case study, only 
the information about the host controller is collected because this case study is 
intended to generate the security requirements for host controller only. The 
collected information is shown in Figure 15. 
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Node Mobile 
tablet 
Host controller Lighting 
control 
HVAC 
control 
Home 
security/safety 
User interface  A touch panel 
for local 
control; a 
network port for 
receiving 
remote 
commands and 
reporting system 
status.  
   
Functionalities  Receiving 
remote 
commands to 
perform actions; 
collecting sub 
nodes status and 
reporting them 
to mobile tablet; 
control sub 
nodes by the 
commands 
entered by local 
users through 
touch panel  
   
Communication 
links 
 Communicate 
with mobile 
tablet via 
network 
connection; 
communicate 
with sub nodes 
via internal 
wireless 
communication 
link 
   
Data on node  User credential; 
system 
configuration 
data; system 
status logging 
data 
   
Other      
Figure 15: Nodes information table for the imaginary SHS 
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It is assumed, in this case study, a security threats check list is not available 
when the SHS is developed and the system developers are required to create the 
check list.  
This check list is created by using the conception and template discussed in 
section 3. The created security threats check list is assumed to be complete for the 
illustration purpose and the checklist is shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: The security threats check list for the imaginary SHS 
The next step is to identify security assets and security threats they are facing 
after the nodes information table and the security threats check list are ready.  
The host controller is evaluated against each of the security threats listed in 
the check list. The node information collected for the host controller is used 
during this evaluation process.  
After the evaluation, the host controller is found to be facing the security 
threats of network eavesdropping and spoofing, internal communication link 
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eavesdropping and spoofing and unauthorized data access. These threats are 
marked out in the security assets and threats table (Figure 17). 
Figure 17: The security assets and threats table of the imaginary SHS 
5.2.1.3 Defining abuse case: 
 For each of the security threats the host controller faces an abuse case is 
defined. One of the purposes of this step is to get a better understanding on how a 
particular security threat can be carried out; another purpose is to generate the 
possibility and risk level information which is used to calculate the priority of a 
particular security threat. The possibility and risk level information are obtained 
by following the steps defined in chapter 4.  
These abuse cases are shown from Figure 18 to Figure 22.    
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Figure 18: The abuse use for networking eavesdropping security threat on 
the host controller 
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Figure 19: The abuse case for network spoofing security threat on the host 
controller 
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Figure 19: The abuse case for the internal communication  eavesdropping 
security threat on the host controller 
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Figure 20: The abuse case for internal communication link spoofing security 
threat on the host controller. 
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Figure 21: The abuse case for the node unauthorized data access security 
threat on the host controller 
5.2.1.4 Prioritization 
Prioritization is a straight forward process. The priority is obtained by using 
the algorithm defined in chapter 4 and the calculated priority is recorded into the 
security assets and threats table for the imaginary SHS. 
5.2.2 Defining high level security requirements .  
The process for defining the high level security requirements can be carried 
out under the assistance of all the information obtained in the previous steps.  
The security threats with higher priority value are considered first and for each 
of them a high level security requirement is defined.  
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For the security threats with very low priority value, the system developers 
may chose to accept such threats to happen due to cost, time - to- market 
constraints. 
The high level security requirements for the host controller in the imaginary 
SHS are recorded in the system security requirements table. Figure 23 – figure 27 
shows the defined high level security requirements.
Figure 23: Security requirement for preventing the host controller from 
unauthorized data access security threat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Figure 24: Security requirement for preventing the host controller from 
network spoofing security threat 
Figure 22: Security requirement for preventing the host controller from 
internal communication spoofing security threat 
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Figure 236: Security requirement for preventing the host controller from 
network eavesdropping security threat. 
Figure 247: Security requirement for preventing the host controller from 
internal communication link eavesdropping security threat 
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5.2.3 Derive functional security requirements from high level 
security requirements 
After defining the high level security requirements the corresponding 
functional security requirements can be derived from them. For example, for the 
high level security requirement to prevent host controller from unauthorized data 
access security threat, a privilege based method can be used to fulfill this 
requirement. As a result, the derived functional requirement could be:  
When a user tries to access a data stored in the host controller, after he/she 
logged into the host controller, the user’s privilege should be checked. 
If the user has the right privilege then he/she is allowed to access the data. 
These two functional security requirements are recorded into the 
corresponding system security requirements table.  
The same process is applied to other high level security requirements. By the 
end of the process, the security requirements specification for the host controller 
is generated (Figure 23- Figure 27).  
When such a process is applied to all other nodes in the SHS, a complete SHS 
security requirements specification can be generated. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
6.1 Conclusion 
 By noting the importance of the security features of the SHS, the lacking 
of a systematic method to understand and solve security problems the SHS facing 
from the requirements engineering level and the problems in security 
requirements specification, a systematic approach to generate to security 
requirements for a SHS under development is proposed in this paper.  
Briefly, in this approach, a SHS security threats profile is build first and then 
the high level security requirements and functional security requirements are 
defined and derived.  
The building of the SHS security threats profile is the core part of this 
solution. It gives the system developers a SHS security threats check list; a clear 
understanding on what security threats a SHS under development might face; the 
steps needed to carry out those security threats; their possibilities to happen; their 
risk level and their priorities. The SHS security threats profile is the basis for 
defining and deriving security requirements. 
This solution can enhance the consistency in the selection of security 
requirements because the building of the security threats profile forces the system 
developers to identify the security threats a SHS might face as completed as 
possible and as a result there is less chance to leave out security requirements on 
some security relevant areas. 
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It can also enhance the consistency in the level of specification details because 
it requires the system developers to define high level security requirements first 
and then to derive functional security requirements. 
6.2 Future works 
Although the SHS security requirements specifications can be generated by 
using the proposed approach, there are still a lot of works could be done in future 
to complete the SHS security requirements engineering process. 
A security threats check list that is specific to the SHS can be build in future. 
This check list can be used directly or used as a reference by the system 
developers when they are dealing with the security problems in the SHS.  
The functional security requirements generated by this approach may contain 
ambiguities and the formal specification is an effective way to resolve them. As a 
result, another future work is to formalize these security requirements by using a 
kind of formal language. 
The specified security requirements should be verified and validated to ensure 
they are actually fulfilling the stakeholders’ expectations. As a result, establishing 
a security requirements verification/validation method which is specific to the 
SHS is also a direction of the future work.  
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